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PREVIEW; Wittman v. City of Billings: Compensable Takings 
Under Montana’s Inverse Condemnation Doctrine. 
Blake Koemans* 
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Wittman v. 
City of Billings on Friday, September 10, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. telephonically 
over Zoom.1 Tucker Gannett and Amanda Sowden of Gannett Sowden 
Law, PLLC, are expected to appear on behalf of appellants Ariane 
Wittman and Jeremy Taylen. Gerry Fagan and Afton Ball of Moulton 
Bellingham PC are expected to appear on behalf of appellee, the City of 
Billings. The Court has also granted Montana Trial Lawyers Association 
leave to participate in oral argument as amicus on behalf of Appellants.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Wittman v. City of Billings, the Court is asked to consider whether, 
in a claim for inverse condemnation, a claimant must show the 
condemning body acted with an intent to damage or take the property. If 
the Montana Supreme Court is interested in jurisprudential explication, 
this case presents the opportunity to clarify what constitutes a taking under 
Article II, § 29 of the Montana Constitution and the related inverse 
condemnation doctrine. However, if the Court does not wish to draw a 
hardline rule it will likely find the case is resolvable on procedural grounds 
under existing law. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 20, 2019, clogged grease in a sewer main caused nearly 1,000 
gallons of raw sewage to build up and discharge into the basement of 
Arianne Wittman’s and Jeremy Taylen’s (“Wittman”) home.2 For at least 
two hours, 1.5 inches of untreated sewage inundated Wittman’s 
basement. 3  The event, known as a sanitary sewer overflow (“SSO”), 
caused significant damage to Wittman’s home. 4  The City of Billings 
(“City”) determined the SSO event was caused by users illegally pouring 
grease down their drain.5  
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law Class of 2023.  
1 A livestream of the argument can be viewed on the Court’s website. http://stream.vision.net/MT-
JUD/. 
2 Brief of Appellants at 1, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Mar. 30, 2021) (No. DA 20-0609). 
3 Memorandum and Order in re: The Plaintiffs’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, 
Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2020) (No. DV 19-1124) [hereinafter Order]. 
4 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 1. 
5 See Brief of Appellee at 2, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. June 6, 2021) (No. DA 20-0609). 
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The City’s sewer system consists of over 500 miles of sewer lines and 
serves more than 32,000 customers.6  The sewer system is owned and 
maintained by the City. 7  Any home within city limits, including 
Wittman’s, must connect to the municipal system. 8  The City’s 
maintenance of the sewer system is extensive. Every year the city spends 
$1.6 million maintaining the system which includes cleaning all 500 miles 
of sewer line.9 Despite the extensive maintenance employed by the City, 
SSO events are an inevitable consequence of municipal sewer systems.10 
On average, Billings experiences 10–15 SSO events every year.11 
On August 13, 2019, Wittman filed a single count complaint against 
the City, claiming damages for inverse condemnation.12 In March 2020, 
Wittman moved for summary judgment, arguing that the damage to their 
home constitutes a taking, requiring just compensation under the Montana 
Constitution. 13  The district court, denying the motion for summary 
judgment, ruled Wittman failed to show that the City had “deliberately 
exercised its right of eminent domain” and could not establish a claim for 
inverse condemnation.14 Further, the district court distinguished between 
a “closed system” – one in which users cannot input into the system – and 
an “open system” – allowing user input.15 The Court then dismissed the 
case sua sponte. 16  Following denial of their 60(b) motion for relief, 
Wittman filed for appeal with the Montana Supreme Court.17 
III. ARGUMENTS 
A. Appellant’s Arguments 
Wittman argues both that the district court incorrectly applied 
Montana law, and that the Court should adopt a new standard for inverse 
condemnation claims. Wittman first asserts that the district court erred in 
ruling claimants must show intent on behalf of the government in an 
inverse condemnation claim.18 Next, Wittman urges the Court to adopt 
 
6 Id. at 3.  
7 Order, supra note 3, at 3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 8.  
10 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 19–22. 
11 Id. at 2.  
12 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2020) 
(No. DV 19-1124). 
13 Id. at 1.  
14 Order, supra note 3, at 10. 
15 Id. at 7–8 (distinguishing Appellants’ facts from those in Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, Cal 
Rptr. 2d 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), in which the claimant’s property was damaged when a city water 
pipe burst. The California Court of Appeal held that any actual physical damage to property 
proximately caused by a public improvement is compensable.). 
16 Id. at 10.  
17 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 2. 
18 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 10. 
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California’s rule for liability in inverse condemnation actions.19 Finally, 
Wittman challenges the district court’s ruling that sewer systems and 
public water distribution systems are not analogous for inverse 
condemnation purposes. 20  In addition to these specific arguments, 
Wittman asserts, throughout their brief, the district court’s ruling, that a 
claimant must show the government acted with an intent to damage, has 
created a new element in inverse condemnation law that is adverse to the 
public policy concerns the doctrine is meant to protect.21 
Wittman first argues the district court erred in ruling that 
claimants must show a condemning authority “deliberately exercised its 
right of eminent domain” to proceed on an inverse condemnation action.22 
Wittman asserts that Montana law on inverse condemnation, as it has 
existed for over 100 years, requires no showing of intent. Relying first on 
a series of cases involving the 1897 widening of Broadway Street in Butte, 
Wittman argues an inverse condemnation action requires only a showing 
of damage to property.23 Tracing the influence of the Less line of cases 
through the 20th and 21st centuries, Wittman states that current inverse 
condemnation law in Montana allows for the recovery of “sufficiently 
peculiar” damages and does not require a claimant to show the 
condemning authority acted negligently or with an intent to damage.24 
Next, Wittman asserts that SSO events caused by grease buildup 
are an inherent consequence of operating a public sewer system.25 Because 
SSO events are inevitable, Wittman argues, fairness requires all members 
of the system bear the burden of the costs. Here, Wittman relies heavily 
on City of Oroville v. Superior Court,26 which articulated California’s 
inverse condemnation standard.27 Under Oroville, a party claiming inverse 
condemnation must show “the damage to private property must be 
substantially caused by an inherent risk presented by the deliberate design, 
construction, or maintenance of a public improvement.”28 Wittman points 
to the record of the case showing witnesses on both sides agree that grease 
buildups are an inevitable consequence of a sewer system, and that a 
 
19 Id. at 19 (citing City of Oroville v. Superior Ct., 446 P.3d 304 (Cal. 2019)). 
20 Id. at 26.  
21 Id. at 27–28.   
22 Id. at 10; Order, supra note 3, at 10. 
23 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 12–13 (citing Less v. City of Butte, 72 P. 140 (1903)). 
24 Id. at 14. See also Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 565 P.2d 632, 637 (1977) (holding that when 
damages are known, knowable, or an inevitable result of a project, claimant need not show negligent 
design, construction, or operation). See also Deschner v. State Dep’t of Highways, 390 P.3d 152 
(Mont. 2017) (holding that a plaintiff in an inverse condemnation claim must prove only (1) that a 
public improvement was deliberately planned and built, and (2) as planned and built, the public 
improvement was the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff’s property). 
25 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 16. 
26 446 P.3d 304 (Cal. 2019). 
27 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 19.  
28 Oroville, 446 P.3d at 312.  
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grease buildup was the cause of SSO event that damaged Wittman’s home. 
Knowing that Montana law does not currently support this argument, 
Wittman attempts to assuage any concern by pointing to the long history 
of California takings law being imported into Montana.29  
Finally, Wittman charges the district court with making up “out of 
whole cloth” the distinction between open and closed systems for inverse 
condemnation analysis. 30  Wittman’s argument here is two-fold. First, 
Wittman argues the district court’s distinction between open and closed 
systems has no precedential support in Montana. 31  Second, Wittman 
argues that even if the Court finds the distinction useful, the overwhelming 
weight of precedent shows that open systems are subject to inverse 
condemnation action.32  
B. Appellee’s Arguments 
In response, the City argues the district court was correct in its analysis 
of Montana inverse condemnation law, several other States have ruled that 
sewage backups are not a compensable taking, and that the rule in Oroville 
should not be adopted and would not change the outcome regardless.33 In 
addition to its primary arguments, the City also urges the Court to consider 
the sweeping policy implications of Wittman’s arguments as well as the 
police power exceptions to inverse condemnation claims.34 
The City first argues the district court was correct in ruling Wittman 
failed to show the City acted with the intent necessary to support an inverse 
condemnation claim. 35  Citing Deschner v. State Department of 
Highways, 36  the City asserts that the root authority of an inverse 
condemnation claim in Montana is the eminent domain provision of the 
Montana Constitution.37 Because Article II, § 29 requires a condemning 
authority to intentionally take or damage property for a public purpose, the 
City argues, any inverse condemnation action must include a similar intent 
to take or damage.38 
Next the City walks through an array of decisions in other states which 
hold that the unintended escape of sewage is not a compensable taking and 
 
29 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 18; See also Montana Trial Lawyers Association’s Amicus 
Curiae Brief at 1, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Mar. 18, 2021) (No. DA 20-0609). 
30 Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 26. 
31 Id. at 27.  
32 Id.  
33 See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note 5. 
34 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 9–10, 19. 
35 Id. at 10; Order, supra note 3, at 6. 
36 390 P.3d 152 (Mont. 2017). 
37 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 7; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29. 
38 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 12. 
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does not support an action for inverse condemnation.39 Most notably, the 
City cites to a Nebraska Supreme Court holding that there was no 
compensable taking under the Nebraska Constitution where raw sewage 
backed up in a sewer line and flooded claimant’s home.40 The City points 
out the similarity in the takings clauses of the Nebraska and Montana 
Constitutions, and argues the case is instructive of how the court should 
dispose of Wittman’s claims.41 
Finally, the City argues that adoption of the Oroville standard is 
inappropriate for three distinct reasons.42 First, the city contends Wittman 
never raised the Oroville standard at trail and should be barred from now 
raising the issue.43 Second, taking up Oroville would require the Court to 
overturn Deschner, decided only four years ago. 44  Third, even under 
Oroville, the City argues, Wittman cannot show that a deliberate choice 
by the City in the design or maintenance of the sewer system substantially 
caused the SSO event.45 
IV. ANALYSIS 
It is settled law in Montana that a taking occurs under inverse 
condemnation when a public property improvement or use, as designed, 
constructed, or maintained proximately causes damage to a claimant.46 
There is no dispute between the parties that the City’s wastewater 
treatment system constitutes a public improvement. Further, there is no 
dispute that Wittman’s property was damaged by the SSO event.47 The 
dispute in this case, and the district court’s ruling, primarily turns on the 
issue of what constitutes causation in an inverse condemnation action. The 
case presents the Court with the opportunity to define how closely the 
actions of a condemning authority and the damage to property must be to 
constitute a taking. However, the peculiar way in which the district court 
disposed of the case may provide a more restrained court with the 
 
39 Id. at 20–30. 
40 Id. at 20–21 (citing Henderson v. City of Columbus, 827 N.W.2d 482, 483 (Neb. 2013)).   
41 Id. at 21 n. 3 (comparing the text of the two constitutions). 
42 Id. at 30.  
43 Id. at 31. But see Reply Brief of Appellants at 13, Wittman v. City of Billings, (Mont. Aug. 12, 
2021) (No. DA 20-0609) (arguing in response that Oroville is consistent with both Rauser and 
Deschner and is simply additional authority for their theory of the case). 
44 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 34. 
45 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 40. 
46 See Deschner v. State Dep’t of Highways, 390 P.3d 152, 158 (Mont. 2017); Rauser v. Toston 
Irrigation Dist.,; Evenhus v. City of Great Falls, No. DDV-06-900 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 31, 2012) 
(adding the additional requirements that the damage be of a kind which is uncommon to other users 
of the system or the public in general, and that the property owner suffer an actual loss—elements 
not included in Deschner); 656 P.2d 632, 638 (Mont. 1977) (holding that a showing of damages 
proximately caused by the undertaking of a public project is sufficient, particularly where the 
damage is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the undertaking). 
47 See Order, supra note 3, at 6. 
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opportunity to avoid pronouncement of any new law, and simply send the 
case back down for further proceedings. 
a. The District Court’s Interpretation of Law 
The district court, in dismissing the case, appears to have introduced 
at least two new requirements to inverse condemnation law. The Court 
will likely need to address the district court’s rulings on the law before 
addressing the dismissal of the case. First the court will likely address the 
district court’s understanding of causation and the intent necessary to 
effectuate a taking. 48  Second, the Court may need to consider the 
distinction between “open” and “closed” systems made by the court 
below.49 
The district court ruling, that causation in inverse condemnation 
requires “deliberate affirmative action by the municipality to take the 
property”, that the City “deliberately [exercise] its right of eminent 
domain” is a significant expansion of current law. Wittman argues, and the 
Court is likely to agree, the district court has imposed a new burden on 
claimants seeking redress for inverse condemnation.50 A city need not act 
for the purpose of effectuating a taking, it must merely undertake a 
deliberate public improvement which, as planned and built, proximately 
causes damage.51 Contrary to the district court’s reasoning below, inverse 
condemnation regularly arises out of the erroneous or inadvertent taking 
of property.52 In Wohl v. City of Missoula,53 Missoula mistakenly relied on 
incorrect survey information to widened a road which infringed on 
adjacent property owners’ homes. In Rauser, seeping water from an 
irrigation project supported the Plaintiff’s takings claim.54 The Court has 
never held an intent to exercise the eminent domain power is a required 
showing in an inverse condemnation action, and it is unlikely to do so now. 
Next the Court may address the district court’s distinction between 
“open” and “closed” systems.55 Wittman relies on Pacific Bell v. City of 
San Diego, 56  a case in which a city was found liable for inverse 
condemnation because it insufficiently maintained cast iron water pipes. 
The district court distinguished Wittman’s case by finding open system 
 
48 Id. at 8.  
49 Id. at 6.  
50 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 10. 
51 Knight v. Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992) (citing Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 
565 P.2d 632 (Mont. 1977)). 
52 Order, supra note 3, at 8. 
53 300 P.3d 1119 (Mont. 2013). 
54 Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 565 P.2d 632, 635 (Mont. 1977). 
55 Order, supra note 3, at 7. 
56 Cal Rptr. 2d 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
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sewer lines not analogous to water pipes.57 The district court does not cite 
any Montana authority for this distinction, likely because there is not any 
authority to cite. Inverse condemnation cases often revolve around public 
improvements, which may be considered “open systems.”58 The court is 
unlikely to adopt this new distinction in inverse condemnation law. 
b. The District Court’s Dismissal 
While the Court may consider the district court’s interpretations of the 
law, the primary issue is whether the district court properly dismissed 
Wittman’s claim. As noted, this case reaches the Court following dismissal 
by the district court.59 On review, it’s likely this Court will treat the case 
as if a cross-motion for summary judgment had been granted.60 Summary 
judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.61 The Court 
will review de novo a grant of summary judgment.62  
Here, any disputed question of material fact as to whether the city’s 
maintenance or design of the sewer system caused the clog would make 
summary judgment inappropriate. In depositions, City employees testified 
that SSO events are a known problem.63 As the district court pointed out, 
the City spends $1.6 million annually cleaning the sewer lines.64 Wittman 
will likely argue that this amount is insufficient as 10–15 SSO events 
continue to occur annually on the city system.65 The City takes care to 
mention that the maintenance of its sewer lines is more robust than any 
other city in Montana.66 Robust as the City’s maintenance may be, its 
sufficiency is likely a material fact in the City’s liability and dispute as to 
its sufficiency should be enough to prevent summary judgment. The Court 
will likely rule that dismissal was erroneous. 
 Further, while the district court characterized the discharge of 
grease into the sewer as “illegal,” Wittman argues that this is a 
 
57 Order, supra note 3, at 7. 
58 See Knight v. Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 1992) (reversing the district court’s summary 
judgment ruling because interference resulting from the public’s heavy use of a dirt road may be 
compensable if it is of sufficient magnitude and peculiar character). 
59 Order, supra note 3, at 10. 
60 See Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 182 P.3d 41, 44 (Mont. 2008) (holding that on a motion for 
summary judgment, a cross-motion is not required for the judge to dismiss the case where it is 
apparent there is no genuine issue of material fact); see also Order Denying Plaintiff’s 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from the Court’s Order re: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Wittman 
v. City of Billings (Mont. Dist. Ct. Nov. 24, 2020) (No. DV 19-1124) (citing Lee and clarifying that 
the dismissal operates as a summary judgment). 
61 MONT. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). 
62 Knight, 827 P.2d at 1276. 
63 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 19–24. 
64 Order, supra note 3, at 3. 
65 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 2. 
66 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 3. 
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mischaracterization.67 The ordinance prohibiting grease discharge appears 
to apply only to “industrial users.”68 Wittman is likely to argue that by 
allowing residential users to discharge material into the sewer, which the 
city is aware causes SSO events, the City’s operation of the system is the 
proximate cause of their damage.69 Wittman will find strong support for 
this argument in the plain language of the inverse condemnation standard. 
Regardless, the applicability of the city code raises issues of material fact 
that likely make summary judgment inappropriate. 
While Wittman has a strong argument that summary judgment was 
improper, the City will likely point to the narrow language of Montana 
inverse condemnation caselaw. Most notably, while Wittman draws a 
broad reading of Rauser, the City argues that the holding was restricted to 
situations in which damage was an inevitable result of the “intentional 
undertaking” of a public project. 70  The City is likely to argue that 
incidental damage, occurring long after the construction of a public project 
cannot form the basis of an inverse condemnation claim. Given the 
implications of holding a municipality liable for damages related to an 
improvement project long after the design and construction of that project, 
the Court will likely be sympathetic to the City’s argument for a narrow 
reading of the standard. However, even under a narrow formulation of the 
law, dispute over the facts likely makes summary judgment improper.  
Additionally, the City is likely to argue that the district court was right 
to decide causation at the summary judgment stage. Generally, in 
litigation, questions of law are to be decided by the court and the jury is 
tasked with deciding questions of fact. Unlike other areas of the law, in 
inverse condemnation causation is often considered a question of law 
rooted in facts.71  In Buhmann, the court found strong support for the 
proposition that, in an inverse condemnation action, the only question for 
the jury is the amount of damages; causation being decided as a matter of 
law.72  However, the Buhmann standard is not always used.73  The full 
extent to which Buhmann’s holding regarding causation should be 
employed is unclear. However, where factual disputes must first be 
resolved to determine if a taking has occurred, causation is a question for 
the jury. 74  Here, the question of causation relies heavily on factual 
circumstances likely making the application of Buhmann inappropriate. 
 
67 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
68 CITY OF BILLINGS, MONT. ORDINANCE § 26-604(b)(9) (2021). 
69 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 22–24. 
70 Rauser v. Toston Irrigation Dist., 565 P.2d 632, 637 (Mont. 1977). 
71 Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 84 (Mont. 2008) (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, LTD., 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999)).  
72 Id. 
73 See Deschner v. State Dep’t of Highways, 930 P.3d 152, 157 (Mont. 2017) (finding the jury was 
properly instructed on the issue of causation). 
74 Buhmann, 201 P.3d at 84–85. 
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Because disputed question of fact remain, the Court is likely to rule that 
the district court was incorrect in granting summary judgment for the City. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Montana has a clear standard for establishing an inverse condemnation 
claim. The district court in this case appears to have introduced new 
elements which will require this Court to consider if the district court’s 
holding is consistent with existing law. The Court is likely to rule narrowly 
that the procedural dismissal of the case at the summary judgment stage 
was improper. Given that this case was not fully argued below, the Court 
is unlikely to use it to adopt new law. Instead, the Court will likely reiterate 
the standard from Deschner and remand the case for further proceeding 
under current Montana law.75  
 
75 Deschner, 930 P.3d at 157. 
